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INTO  THE  WEEDS:
MODERN  DISCRIMINATION  LAW
Sandra F. Sperino*
INTRODUCTION
Modern discrimination law is the law of minutiae.  Judicial energy is not
primarily focused on large questions about why workplace inequality exists or
how to prevent it.  It is not even focused on whether the plaintiff in a particu-
lar case was treated differently because of a protected trait.  Instead, judicial
energy centers on interpreting and applying an ever-growing phalanx of
complicated court-created ancillary doctrines.
Since the 1970s, the federal courts have created a number of frameworks
to analyze discrimination claims.1  Each framework provides a roadmap for
proving a certain theory of discrimination.  Over time, the courts have added
bells and whistles to these basic roadmaps.  These court-created ancillary doc-
trines or subdoctrines require an ever-increasing amount of judicial
attention.2
While legal scholars have challenged the ancillary doctrines individu-
ally,3 this Article examines them collectively.  When viewed collectively, it is
easier to see how the system of creating and using ancillary doctrines is signif-
© 2020 Sandra F. Sperino.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
I am indebted to faculty who provided insightful comments and questions through the
Notre Dame School of Law Faculty Colloquium, the Saint Louis University School of Law
Faculty Colloquium, and the University of Missouri School of Law Faculty Colloquium.
1 See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69
(2011) (providing an overview of the frameworks used to evaluate disparate treatment,
harassment, retaliation, and disparate impact).
2 This scenario is not unique to discrimination law. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Romanc-
ing the Real, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 573, 577 (2003) (describing similar situation in zoning
law); Randall R. Rader, Foreword, Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct in Flux, 59 AM.
U. L. REV. 777, 785–86 (2010) (describing a similar problem in patent law).
3 See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728,
731–35 (2011) (explaining deficiencies in the “similarly situated” test); Natasha T. Martin,
Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 347–51 (2010) (critiquing the “stray remarks” doctrine);
see also Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employ-
ment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 179–80 (2012) (similarly critiquing the stray
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icantly flawed.4  Any benefits that derive from it are outweighed by its
problems.
First, the subdoctrine jurisprudence is ineffective.  As this Article will
demonstrate, the court-created subdoctrines create confusion in even the
simplest cases.  A judge can use the current doctrine to reach conflicting
results: either granting summary judgment for the employer or letting a case
go to trial.5  According to the established ancillary doctrines, either outcome
can be justified.
Second, by looking at the ancillary doctrines together, rather than as
separate concepts, a pattern emerges.  In each instance, courts created an
employment-discrimination-specific paradigm that is one or two steps
removed from the statutory language, using new language and concepts that
are not found in the original statutes.  Any objective review of the new lan-
guage reveals scores of unanswered questions hidden within it.  After the
courts create the particular framework or defense, years or decades of confu-
sion follow, as judges try to interpret the original judicially created idea.
At times, the judges find words within the original concept and turn
these words into terms of art.  The terms of art derive from the judicially
created concept, and not from the statutes themselves.  Judges then spend
time defining these terms of art, which are yet another step removed from
the original statutes.
The terms of art also contain terms of art.  Judges must then define
these secondary terms of art, which are at least three steps removed from the
original statutes.  At times, the original terms of art or secondary terms of art
appear to conflict with or are in tension with other court-created terms of art.
The courts must then resolve how these terms of art relate to one another.
These issues are even further removed from the statute.
In some instances, judges interpret the framework, doctrine, or defense
in a particular way, and then encounter a factual scenario that does not fit
comments doctrine, and particularly the way in which courts employ the “stray” designa-
tion in determining the evidentiary worth of comment evidence).
4 At the outset, it is worth noting critiques about legal reasoning generally. See, e.g.,
Baron, supra note 2, at 573 (“Whether we talk doctrine, policy, or values, we, along with
our opponents, play a fundamentally empty and meaningless game with fundamentally
empty and meaningless forms.  You cannot advance your cause with mere shadows.”);
Kimberle´ Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitima-
tion in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1349–50 (1988); Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1984).
5 For a similar critique of statutory interpretation canons, see Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950), as reprinted in KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS app. C at 521–28 (1960); and LLEWELLYN,
supra, app. C at 528–35. But see Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpreta-
tion, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1225 (defending the apparent inconsistencies in the canons as
“stem[ming] from the fact that the implicatures arising from the maxims are always cancel-
able and often have to be weighed against one another to determine which implicature is
the strongest in a given case”).
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well within the original iteration.  Judges then formalize an exception.  At
times, they have then created exceptions to the exceptions.  The exceptions
and the exceptions to the exceptions are not always neatly defined, causing
confusion.  In addition, circuits formalize different exceptions, creating cir-
cuit splits.  While each of the ancillary doctrines discussed in this Article can
be critiqued individually, it also is important to illuminate the pattern of doc-
trines, subdoctrines, and sub-subdoctrines that is a structural feature of this
court-created jurisprudence.
Third, this Article argues that any new court-created doctrines are sub-
ject to these same structural problems.  It shows how “cat’s paw” doctrine is
heading down the same path as older subdoctrines.  And, as the courts con-
tinue to add more and more doctrines, the field is beginning to collapse on
itself.  The court-created doctrines collide with one another, creating ques-
tions that not only cannot be resolved in any principled way but also do not
help us understand why discrimination exists or how to stop it.  This is, in
part, because the subdoctrines are so disconnected from the statutes’ texts
and purposes.
Finally, I show how the ancillary doctrines underestimate the complexity
of the modern workplace and enshrine factual inferences that are not univer-
sally true.  These problems are baked into all of the ancillary doctrines.
Courts should abolish most, if not all, of the court-created ancillary doctrines
and create a statement rule strongly discouraging courts from creating new
ancillary doctrines in the future.  I propose a way forward that relies on statu-
tory text, Supreme Court caselaw relating to context, and values enshrined in
the Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  These
sources all caution judges to be careful about how much they know and can
infer from a particular set of facts, and to judge evidence in its totality.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I explores how the court-created
doctrines do not provide a principled basis for judges to resolve even simple
cases.  Part II focuses on several ancillary doctrines and shows how each of
these doctrines is removed from the text and purposes of the statute.  Each
doctrine has spawned its own set of terms of art, exceptions, and subdoc-
trines, which draw the courts into endless questions about how to interpret
and apply the court-created doctrine.  Part III discusses how a new ancillary
doctrine, cat’s paw theory, is prone to these same problems.  Part IV explores
how employment discrimination law is collapsing in on itself as courts are
called upon to resolve conflicts between the ancillary doctrines.  Part V shows
how the ancillary doctrines contain mistaken factual inferences and underes-
timate the complexity of the American workplace.  It proposes that courts
abolish or diminish the ancillary doctrines and create a statement rule
strongly discouraging courts from creating new ones.
I. THE DOCTRINES ARE INEFFECTIVE
One way to test the effectiveness of the ancillary doctrines is to deter-
mine whether they help courts resolve cases.  In the employment discrimina-
tion context, judges are often asked to determine whether it is proper to
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grant an employer summary judgment or whether there are enough factual
disputes to allow the case to go to trial.  This Part will demonstrate how even
in the simplest kinds of employment discrimination cases, the ancillary doc-
trines are not effective.
All of the ideas discussed in this Article ostensibly stem from the courts’
interpretations of the federal discrimination statutes.  Title VII is the corner-
stone federal employment discrimination statute.  Title VII prohibits an
employer from discriminating against a worker because of race, sex, national
origin, color, or religion.6  Title VII’s main operative provision consists of two
subparts.  Under the first subpart, it is an unlawful employment practice for
an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”7
Under Title VII’s second subpart, it is unlawful for an employer “to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”8  These two
subparts form the foundation of Title VII’s text.9  The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) contains similar main language,10 and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) contains similar concepts, although not
always stated in the same language.11
One common scenario in discrimination law unfolds as follows.  A super-
visor refers to a worker using racist or sexist slurs or epithets.  In some cases,
the worker then uses the slurs or epithets as the basis of a harassment claim.
In other cases, the worker uses the slurs or epithets to show that the supervi-
sor took a negative action because of race or sex.  Even though these are the
most basic employment discrimination cases, it is difficult to predict whether
such cases will go to jury trial or whether the court will grant summary judg-
ment in the employer’s favor.
Take for example the following case.  In Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau
Corp., a worker filed a racial harassment claim submitting evidence her super-
visor called her “porch monkey” twice.12  Although the judge did “not ques-
tion that the term is highly offensive to African Americans,” the judge found
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
7 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
8 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
9 Congress amended Title VII in 1991. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071.  However, this does not change the fact that the foundational text of Title
VII is contained in § 2000e-2(a).
10 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012).
11 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
12 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. 12-212, 2013 WL 1413031, at *2–3 (D.
Md. Apr. 4, 2013), vacated en banc, 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015).  The supervisor denied
making the comments. Id. Throughout this Article, I refer to the evidence submitted by
the parties.  Often, the employer contests the plaintiff’s evidence.  I am not making any
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the isolated comments did not meet the required level of seriousness to
count as harassment under federal law.13  The judge used the “severe or per-
vasive” doctrine to grant summary judgment for the employer.14
The “severe or pervasive” concept comes from the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, in which the Court recognized
that sexual harassment is cognizable under Title VII.15  In Meritor, the
Supreme Court discussed whether the words “‘terms, conditions, or privi-
leges’ of employment” encompass sexual harassment.16  The Court stated
that “[t]he phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces a
congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women’ in employment.”17  The Court continued: “[W]e agree,
that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimi-
nation based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”18
Rather than using the statutory language to define the level of harm required
to prevail under the harassment theory, the Court created a new term of
art—“severe or pervasive.”  The Court stated that harassment affects the
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment when it is “sufficiently severe
or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment.’”19
The Supreme Court did not define why severe or pervasive was the
touchstone for altering the conditions of a victim’s employment.  For exam-
ple, if a supervisor threatened to fire a worker twice because of his race, a
reasonable worker would believe the terms or conditions of his work were
affected, even though the behavior was not severe or pervasive.  Since the
Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor, the courts have tried to determine what
is sufficient to be “severe or pervasive” and what is not, developing a complex
set of rules and standards for what counts and what does not.20  One line of
cases covers when slurs and epithets are sufficient to establish harassment.
The worker in Boyer-Liberto appealed the case to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  While the three-judge panel noted that the
claims about whether discrimination did or did not occur in a particular case, just whether
the evidence might be sufficient for a factfinder to find discrimination.
13 Id. at *3.
14 Id. at *3–4.
15 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986).
16 Id. at 64.
17 Id. (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978)).
18 Id. at 66.
19 Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
20 See Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 229, 241–43 (2018) (discussing the “severe or pervasive” doctrine); see also Judith J.
Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment to Be
“Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62 MD. L. REV.
85, 85 (2003) (similarly discussing the “severe or pervasive” doctrine); cf. Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1692–1710 (1998) (discussing the
early development of sexual harassment law).
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use of the term “porch monkey” was “racially derogatory and highly offen-
sive,” it upheld the grant of summary judgment.21  The statements could not
constitute harassment because the plaintiff only asserted her supervisor
called her “porch monkey” twice.22
The full Fourth Circuit en banc reversed.23  It held that a reasonable
jury could find that the worker was subjected to racial harassment.24  The
court noted that “[p]erhaps no single act can more quickly alter the condi-
tions of employment and create an abusive working environment than the
use of an unambiguously racial epithet.”25
Multiple judges looked at this same set of facts.  To many of the judges,
the facts could never constitute harassment because they were not severe or
pervasive enough to state a claim under the statute.  To other judges, even a
single use of the racial epithet would be severe enough.  There are other
cases from different circuits involving use of the “porch monkey” epithet.  At
times judges allow the cases to proceed.26  Other times they do not.27
Indeed, there is almost no way to predict the outcome of harassment
cases involving racist or sexist slurs or epithets.  Contrast the Fourth Circuit’s
finding that the use of a racial epithet is sufficient to establish harassment
with the following cases:
• Harassment was not severe or pervasive when a worker testified that
he saw the rebel flag on tool boxes and hard hats, the letters “KKK”
scrawled into places, and a noose in another employee’s locker and
that a supervisor called him “n*****” three times and repeatedly
called him “boy.”28
• Conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to support a claim for
racial harassment when a worker presented evidence that her super-
visor referred to her as “ghetto” and a manager referred to other
African American employees as monkeys.29
21 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 356, 360 (4th Cir. 2014),
vacated on reh’g en banc, 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015).
22 Id. at 357.
23 Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 268.
24 Id. at 280.
25 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179,
185 (4th Cir. 2001)).
26 See, e.g., Curry v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 805, 835 (E.D. Mich. 2009)
(noting that while use of a racist epithet alone might not create a hostile environment, it
could be added to other factors to allow claim to proceed).
27 See, e.g., Cargo v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., No. 05-2010, 2012 WL 4596757, at *6–7 (W.D.
La. Oct. 1, 2012) (holding that the isolated use of a racist epithet did not create a hostile
environment).
28 Barrow v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 144 F. App’x 54, 57–58 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
29 Harrington v. Disney Reg’l Entm’t, Inc., 276 F. App’x 863, 876 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam).
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• Evidence of comments by a supervisor that she did not want to work
with people like the plaintiff and that “whites rule” was not sufficient
to state a claim for racial harassment.30
• Evidence that independent contractors and a manager referred to
the plaintiff as “boy” and “porch monkey” and used term “n*****-
rigged” was not sufficient to be severe or pervasive.31
Even within the severe or pervasive doctrine, there is contradictory caselaw
about whether the single use of an epithet is ever sufficient to establish
harassment.32
Contradictory outcomes also appear in cases where the plaintiff tries to
use evidence of a racist or sexist slur to support her claim that her race or sex
caused a negative employment outcome.  Some judges use the stray remarks
to declare that a supervisor’s use of slurs or epithets does not count as evi-
dence of discrimination.  Other judges look at the exact same evidence and
find that there is sufficient evidence to go to a jury.
The most famous example of this is Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.33  In that
case, two African American men alleged that the company denied them pro-
motions because of their race.34  The plaintiffs presented evidence, which
included evidence that the plant manager, who made the promotion deci-
sions, referred to each of them as “boy.”35  After a jury found in their favor,
the trial court judge reversed the verdict, noting that even if the supervisor
referred to the workers as “boy,” the employees had not shown that the man-
ager’s use of that term was racial in nature.36  The appellate court also found
that the mere use of the word “boy” was not evidence of discrimination when
its use was not modified by a racial classification.37
In Ash v. Tyson, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s deci-
sion regarding the use of the word “boy.”38  The Court noted:
Although it is true the disputed word will not always be evidence of racial
animus, it does not follow that the term, standing alone, is always benign.
The speaker’s meaning may depend on various factors including context,
30 Baker v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 278 F. App’x 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2008)
(per curiam).
31 Holt v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 194, 204 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); see
also McCurdy v. Ala. Disability Determination Serv., No. 2:13cv934, 2015 WL 5737103, at
*14 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2015).
32 Compare Wyre v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., No. 14-1759, 2015 WL 222327, at *5 (E.D.
La. Jan. 14, 2015) (compiling cases holding that a single use of an epithet is not sufficient),
with Jasmin v. N.J. Econ. Dev. Auth., No. 16-1002, 2018 WL 3617955, at *10 (D.N.J. July 30,
2018) (collecting cases holding that a single use of an epithet is sufficient).
33 546 U.S. 454, 455–56 (2006) (per curiam).
34 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 96-3257-M, 2004 WL 5138005, at *1, *4 (N.D. Ala. Mar.
26, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 F. App’x 529 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), vacated
and remanded, 546 U.S. 454.
35 Id. at *6.
36 Id. at *1, *6, *9.
37 129 F. App’x at 533.
38 546 U.S. at 456–58.
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inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage.  Insofar as the
Court of Appeals held that modifiers or qualifications are necessary in all
instances to render the disputed term probative of bias, the court’s decision
is erroneous.39
Most cases do not end up in the Supreme Court, and outcomes similar
to the ones reached by the lower courts in Ash v. Tyson are common.40
Courts often invoke the stray remarks doctrine to decline to consider evi-
dence offered by the plaintiff in employment discrimination cases.41
Through this doctrine, judges can refuse to consider evidence of discrimina-
tory comments or actions in the workplace if the court deems the comments
too remote in time from the contested decision, not made in the context of
the decision, or too ambiguous to show discriminatory bias.42
The stray remarks doctrine is a court-created doctrine that allows courts
to declare that certain remarks are not relevant to an underlying claim of
discrimination.  The stray remarks doctrine is not contained within the text
of any of the federal discrimination statutes.43  Instead, the stray remarks
doctrine is a special evidentiary rule that courts created and apply in discrimi-
nation cases.  The stray remarks doctrine first appeared in a concurring opin-
ion by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.44  In that case, Justice O’Connor noted:
Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual
harassment, cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or
promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria.  Nor can statements
39 Id. at 456.  The dispute about whether the term “boy” was racial in nature continued
after the Supreme Court opinion. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 F. App’x 924, 926
(11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
40 See Chappell v. Bilco Co., No. 3:09CV00016, 2011 WL 9037, at *9 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 3,
2011) (granting summary judgment to employer), aff’d, 675 F.3d 1110 (8th Cir. 2012).
41 Former federal judge Nancy Gertner referred to the doctrine as “[h]igh on the list
of heuristics that fundamentally distort the outcome of discrimination cases.”  Nancy Gert-
ner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 118 (2012); see also Martin, supra note 3, at
347–48; Stone, supra note 3, at 180.
42 See Mosberger v. CPG Nutrients, No. 01100, 2002 WL 31477292, at *8 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 6, 2002) (“Discriminatory stray remarks are generally considered in one of three
categories—those made (1) by a non-decisionmaker; (2) by a decisionmaker but unrelated
to the decision process; or (3) by a decisionmaker but ‘temporally remote’ from the
adverse employment decision.” (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983
F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also Hasemann v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No.
3:11-cv-554, 2013 WL 696424, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2013) (noting that the following
issues are relevant to the stray remarks inquiry: “(1) who made the remark, i.e., a deci-
sionmaker, a supervisor, or a low-level coworker; (2) when the remark was made in relation
to the employment decision at issue; (3) the content of the remark, i.e., whether a reasona-
ble juror could view the remark as discriminatory; and (4) the context in which the remark
was made, i.e., whether it was related to the decision making process” (quoting Silver v. N.
Shore Univ. Hosp., 490 F. Supp. 2d 354, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2007))).
43 Courts do not uniformly apply the stray remarks doctrine, and some judges have
criticized it. See, e.g., Holmes v. Marriott Corp., 831 F. Supp. 691, 704–05 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
44 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the
decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden in this
regard.45
Justice O’Connor was not claiming that the stray remarks were not relevant
in intentional discrimination cases.  Rather, she was making a narrow claim
related to the specific issue raised in Price Waterhouse about whether a plaintiff
could proceed under a mixed-motive framework without what she called
“direct evidence” of discrimination.46  While her remarks were part of a con-
curring opinion and are not controlling law, courts have expanded on her
idea.  As Professor Kerri Lynn Stone has noted, after Price Waterhouse, “the so-
called stray comments doctrine . . . had a groundswell of usage, building in
popularity year after year.”47  Professor Jessica Clarke has observed that the
doctrine has “spread like a cancer through lower court opinions in a number
of procedural contexts.”48
Just as with the severe or pervasive doctrine, it is difficult to determine
when a court will use the stray remarks doctrine to declare an epithet or slur
irrelevant and when a court will allow that same epithet or slur to be used as
key evidence supporting the plaintiff’s claim that she faced discrimination.49
It is nearly impossible to predict how a court will choose to resolve a case
when the defendant invokes the stray remarks doctrine.
Looking at the caselaw in the aggregate shows that the subdoctrines of
“severe or pervasive” and the stray remarks doctrine do not help resolve even
the most basic employment discrimination factual scenarios: those involving
supervisors using patently offensive epithets and slurs.  This, standing alone,
is a compelling reason to question the benefits that courts derive from creat-
ing and applying such doctrines.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 269, 270–71.  The stray remarks doctrine is also confusing because some
judges appear to be using it to determine whether a plaintiff relies on direct or circumstan-
tial evidence for purposes of determining whether the court should use the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. See, e.g., Natal Pe´rez v. Oriental Bank & Tr., 291 F.
Supp. 3d 215, 225–26 (D.P.R. 2018).  If a court uses the stray remarks doctrine in this
context, it may still allow the “stray remark” to serve as circumstantial evidence of discrimi-
nation.  Courts often conflate the issue of whether evidence counts as direct evidence with
the question of whether it counts as evidence at all.
47 Stone, supra note 3, at 170.
48 Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 542 (2018).
49 Compare Boyd v. State Farm Ins., 158 F.3d 326, 329–30 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
a racial epithet was a stray remark in a “failure to promote” case), and Vega v. Chi. Park
Dist., 165 F. Supp. 3d 693, 703 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that certain remarks, including
those referring to the plaintiff as a “bitch” and opining that “she looks like a dude,” were
stray remarks and not sufficient to defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment), and
Martin v. Kroger Co., 65 F. Supp. 2d 516, 549 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (describing some slurs that
are stray remarks and thus do not count as evidence of discrimination), aff’d mem., 224
F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2000), with Williams v. Mercy Health Sys., 866 F. Supp. 2d 490, 499 (E.D.
Pa. 2012) (finding epithets could be probative of discrimination), and Reid v. Evergreen
Aviation Ground Logistics Enter. Inc., No. 07-1641, 2009 WL 136019, at *9 (D. Or. Jan. 20,
2009) (parsing which epithets and slurs are stray remarks and which are not).
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II. A PATTERN EMERGES
Not only are the subdoctrines ineffective, they are also far removed from
the original statutes they purport to support.  This Part demonstrates a famil-
iar pattern that occurs with these ancillary doctrines.  The Supreme Court
often creates a framework for evaluating a certain theory of discrimination,
such as the multipart framework for evaluating harassment cases or the
McDonnell Douglas three-part burden-shifting test for some disparate treat-
ment cases.  The frameworks introduce new terms of art and concepts into
the jurisprudence.  The frameworks also generate many questions about how
to apply these terms of art and concepts in particular cases.  The Supreme
Court or the lower courts then create a series of subdoctrines to better define
the original framework.  At times, they create myriad exceptions to the ancil-
lary rules.  They also create sub-subdoctrines that also come with their own
terms of art and inherent ambiguity.
This Part illuminates this pattern by exploring some of the ancillary doc-
trines that arise under the McDonnell Douglas test and those that arise from
the multipart test for evaluating harassment.
A. McDonnell Douglas: One Step Away
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided the case of McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green.50  In that case, the Court first enunciated the three-part burden-
shifting framework that is now called the McDonnell Douglas test.
Since 1973, both courts and litigants have struggled to understand and
apply the three-step burden-shifting framework.  Scholars have argued that
the test is now a device used by some judges to defeat plaintiffs’ claims.51
Additionally, some members of the Supreme Court have stated that the
numerous and complicated frameworks courts use in the employment con-
text make employment law “difficult for the bench and bar”52 and that
“[l]ower courts long have had difficulty applying McDonnell Douglas.”53  One
commentator described the test as having “befuddled most of those who have
attempted to master it”54 and called the burden-shifting framework “com-
plex” and “somewhat Byzantine.”55
The McDonnell Douglas test is one way for a plaintiff to prove a discrimi-
nation claim.  In the 1973 case, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff pro-
ceeding on a disparate treatment claim based on circumstantial evidence
could prove his case through a three-part burden-shifting framework.56  In
50 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
51 See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 229 (1993).
52 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 291.
54 Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual
Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 859 (2004).
55 Id. at 862.
56 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973).
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the McDonnell Douglas case, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could
establish the prima facie case by showing
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant’s qualifications.57
The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that the facts required to establish a
prima facie case will necessarily vary, depending on the factual scenario of
the underlying case.58  The Supreme Court has stated on numerous occa-
sions that the prima facie case is not supposed to be onerous.59
After the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, a rebuttable presump-
tion of discrimination arises.60  The analysis then proceeds to the second step
of McDonnell Douglas.  After a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the allegedly discriminatory decision or action, thereby rebutting
the presumption.61  If the employer does this, the inquiry proceeds to the
third step.
In the third step, the plaintiff may show that the employer’s stated rea-
son is pretext.62  From this showing, a factfinder may infer that the employer
discriminated because of a protected trait.  In the third step, the plaintiff may
also rely on any other evidence that helps to establish that the employee’s
protected trait caused the outcome.63
The Supreme Court did not purport to ground the McDonnell Douglas
test within the text of Title VII.  The Court has cryptically stated that McDon-
nell Douglas does not represent the elements of a claim under Title VII, but
rather is an evidentiary standard that can be used to evaluate employment
discrimination cases.64  The burden shifting and many of the factors within it
are not drawn from Title VII’s text.
On its face, McDonnell Douglas leaves many unanswered questions,
including, but not limited to the following: How are courts allowed to modify
the prima facie case?  What is the plaintiff’s burden in the prima facie case?
After the plaintiff makes the prima facie case, what benefit accrues?  What
does a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason mean?  What happens if the
employer provides an unbelievable reason?  What is the defendant’s burden
at the second step?  What does pretext mean?  Is pretext alone sufficient?
Can the plaintiff use evidence from the prima facie case to support the pre-
57 Id. at 802.
58 Id. at 802 n.13.
59 See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015); Tex. Dep’t
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
60 O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311–12 (1996).
61 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
62 Id. at 804.
63 Id. at 804–05.
64 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
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text showing?  What evidence, other than evidence of pretext, is sufficient to
meet the third step?  Is the plaintiff required to establish intent, or is the
proper concept causation?
The case also introduced several terms of art into employment discrimi-
nation law, such as “qualified” for a job; “legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son”; and “pretext.”65  Each of these terms of art has developed its own line
of cases interpreting them.66  Even more than forty years after the Supreme
Court decided McDonnell Douglas, courts still have not consistently defined
“qualified” or “pretext.”  For purposes of clarity, this Article cannot fully
explore all of the ancillary doctrines within employment discrimination law
because there are simply too many.  However, these examples show how just
one case can create a ripple effect of ancillary doctrines.  Importantly, none
of these new terms is contained within Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA.
After McDonnell Douglas, significant confusion existed about how to
apply the three-part burden-shifting framework, especially regarding what
the shifting burdens meant for litigants.67  In Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, the Court indicated that “[t]he burden of establishing a
prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”68  According to the
Court, the prima facie case serves the function of “eliminat[ing] the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.”69
The Court further explained that if the plaintiff makes a prima facie
case, the defendant is required to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions to rebut the presumption of discrimination.70  The
defendant’s burden is one of production only.71  After the defendant has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff has the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason
for the employment decision.  The Court indicated that the plaintiff “may
succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”72  The Court
held that the “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defen-
65 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 804.
66 See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000)
(discussing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981) (discussing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason); McKinney
v. Office of the Sheriff, 866 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2017) (discussing qualified); Loyd v.
Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 2014) (discussing qualified); infra
subsection II.B.3 (discussing pretext).
67 See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 249–50.
68 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
69 Id. at 253–54.
70 Id. at 254–56.
71 Id. at 255–56.
72 Id. at 256.
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dant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff.”73
In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, the Court considered whether the
factfinder’s rejection of the employer’s asserted reason for its action man-
dated a finding for the plaintiff.74  The Supreme Court held that while the
factfinder’s rejection of the employer’s proffered reason permits the
factfinder to infer discrimination, it does not compel such a finding.75
B. McDonnell Douglas: Multiple Steps Away
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court specifically noted that courts
would need to modify parts of the framework to fit different factual scena-
rios.76  In the second step away from the statute, federal district and appellate
courts began determining which iterations of the prima facie case they would
allow.  Even more than forty years after McDonnell Douglas, courts are still
discussing how to modify the factors of the burden-shifting test.77
There are a number of subdoctrines that courts have used in the context
of McDonnell Douglas.  Some further explain the prima facie case or the bur-
den-shifting framework.  Some explore what a plaintiff must show to establish
the third step of the test.  Others, like the same actor inference, the same
protected class inference, and the stray remarks doctrine, are not officially
part of the test, but are often used in conjunction with it.78
73 Id. at 253.
74 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504, 511 (1993).
75 Id. at 511.
76 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973).
77 See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354–55 (2015); see also
SANDRA SPERINO, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION LAW ch. 4, BNA (database updated May 2019).
78 The same protected class doctrine presumes that a person who is in the same pro-
tected class as the worker would not discriminate against the worker based on the pro-
tected trait that they share.  Warenecki v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-1450, 2010 WL
4344558, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2010).  The same actor inference allows a court to assume
that if a supervisor made a positive decision in favor of a worker that the same supervisor’s
later negative action against that same worker cannot be discriminatory.  Brown v. CSC
Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996).  Some courts will use the same actor infer-
ence where there is a short period of time between the positive decision and the later
negative decision.  Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 796–97 (4th Cir. 1991).  However, courts
have applied the doctrine when the time between the positive decision and the negative
decision was seven years.  Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine
Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1117, 1135 (2008).
But see Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (criticizing use of
the doctrine when there is a long intervening period between the positive decision and the
negative one).  For example, if a supervisor hired an older worker and then a few years
later fires the worker, the court will assume that the supervisor did not take age into
account when firing the worker.  Supreme Court precedent contradicts both the same
actor and same protected class inferences. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 139, 152, 154 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence of discrimination to submit
to jury without acknowledging an inference that the employment decisionmakers older
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For purposes of time and clarity, we will focus on three doctrines related
to the McDonnell Douglas test: the adverse action factor, the concept of simi-
larly situated workers, and pretext.  We explored the stray remarks doctrine
as it relates to slurs and epithets in Part I.  There is an entire body of cases
related to what kinds of remarks count as stray and what kinds do not.79
1. Adverse Action
In the McDonnell Douglas case itself, the Supreme Court stated that for
the third factor of the prima facie case, the plaintiff was required to establish
that “despite his qualifications, he was rejected.”80  When lower courts first
applied the McDonnell Douglas test, they often inserted the challenged
employment action into the analysis.81  So, for example, in the third prong a
plaintiff might be required to prove that she was denied a promotion or that
she was not hired.  There are numerous types of employment actions that
might fall within this third prong, and courts began to develop a shorthand
for describing the third prong, rather than making it case specific.
Although the actual words varied, the courts began to describe this third
prong as requiring that the plaintiff establish that she was subjected to an
adverse action.82  These are not words found in Title VII.  Instead, Title VII
refers to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” or to the
“limit[ing], segregat[ing], or classify[ing] . . . in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of” the individual’s pro-
tected trait.83  Even though Title VII itself provides language about the
than fifty could not discriminate because of age); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding that men can discriminate against men).
79 SPERINO, supra note 77, ch. 8.
80 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
81 See, e.g., Farber v. Arrow Co., No. 82 Civ. 7563, 1986 WL 10731, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 1986); Citron v. Jackson State Univ., 456 F. Supp. 3, 11 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (noting
that the plaintiff complained of several different employment actions, and analyzing
them).
82 Tukay v. United Airlines, Inc., 708 F. App’x 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2018); Hogue v. Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 718 F. App’x 877, 879 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Chew v. City
& County of San Francisco, 714 F. App’x 687, 691 (9th Cir. 2017); Reedy v. Rich Transp.,
LLC, 712 F. App’x 516, 521 (6th Cir. 2017); Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 870 F.3d 206,
213–14 n.11 (3d Cir. 2017); Edwards v. Hiland Roberts Dairy, Co., 860 F.3d 1121, 1125
(8th Cir. 2017); Hiatt v. Colo. Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307, 1316 (10th Cir. 2017); Williams v.
Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health Sys., Inc., 689 F. App’x 374, 375 (5th Cir.
2017) (per curiam); Mussallihattillah v. McGinnis, 684 F. App’x 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2017);
Tshibaka v. Sernulka, 673 F. App’x 272, 278 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Kuttner v.
Zaruba, 819 F.3d 970, 976 (7th Cir. 2016); Del Valle-Santana v. Servicios Legales de P.R.,
Inc., 804 F.3d 127, 130 (1st Cir. 2015); Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1091 (D.C. Cir.
2015).  The courts also used similar words to describe the required harm for retaliation.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006).
83 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 15  6-MAR-20 10:46
2020] into  the  weeds:  modern  discrimination  law 1091
required level of harm, the lower courts chose to insert the words “adverse
action” into the jurisprudence and to define this new term of art.
There is wide variation across circuits and even among panels within
circuits regarding the words used to define this new term of art.  For exam-
ple, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently described an
adverse action as follows:
For discrimination claims, “[a]n adverse employment action is a signifi-
cant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision caus-
ing a significant change in benefits.”  “[A] mere inconvenience or an altera-
tion of job responsibilities” does not qualify as an adverse action.84
Another court described the requirement as follows: “A plaintiff sustains an
adverse employment action if he or she endures a ‘materially adverse change’
in the terms and conditions of employment.”85  The Eleventh Circuit
described adverse action as requiring the plaintiff to “show a ‘serious and
material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’  We
use an objective standard when assessing whether the employment action was
‘serious and material.’”86
After creating the “adverse action” term of art, the courts were required
to apply that new concept to all of the various kinds of negative actions that
might occur in the workplace.  This introduced a third level of doctrine
about what actions counted and what actions did not count as adverse
actions.  If an action is not an adverse action, then an employer can take the
action based on a protected trait without facing liability under federal dis-
crimination law.
There is wide divergence among circuits and even within circuits about
whether some actions count as an adverse action.  As one court noted,
“[d]ivergent authority, nationwide, obscures the parameters of adverse
employment action.”87  The Eleventh Circuit has noted that courts use differ-
ent words to describe what counts as an adverse action, including “‘signifi-
cant,’ ‘materially adverse,’ and ‘serious and tangible.’”88
In all circuits, actions specifically mentioned within the primary opera-
tive language of the discrimination statutes are cognizable.  Thus, courts
allow claims for terminations, failures to hire,89 discriminatory demotions,90
84 Hiatt, 858 F.3d at 1316 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting
Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 635 (10th Cir. 2012); and then quoting
Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007)).
85 Pfizenmayer v. Hicksville Pub. Sch., 700 F. App’x 64, 65 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)).
86 Rainey v. Holder, 412 F. App’x 235, 238 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation
omitted) (quoting Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001)).
87 Nelson v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 923 F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Me. 1996).
88 Martin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 702 F. App’x 952, 956 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Davis, 245
F.3d at 1239).
89 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
90 See, e.g., Acevedo Martinez v. Coatings Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1068 (D.P.R.
2003).
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and pay differentials.  However, outside of these actions or similar actions,
there is wide disagreement about what constitutes an adverse action and what
does not.  Some courts will find that the following conduct is not an adverse
action91:
• giving an employee a negative evaluation or write-up;92
• denying a lateral transfer;93
• transferring an employee to a less desirable job;94
• reprimanding or threatening a worker with disciplinary action;95
• excessively scrutinizing a worker’s job performance;96
• failing to train an employee;97
• threatening to fire a worker;98 and
• assigning additional or more difficult work.99
91 A plaintiff can establish that a constructive discharge is an adverse action.  There is a
separate body of caselaw about what constitutes a constructive discharge. See, e.g., Alba v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 198 F. App’x 288, 294 (4th Cir. 2006).  If a plaintiff cannot establish a
constructive discharge, a question might still remain about whether the actions taken by
the employer constitute an adverse action or harassment.
92 See, e.g., Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Mitchom v. Bi-State
Dev. Agency, 43 F. App’x 958, 959 (7th Cir. 2002); Taylor v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-
CV-3582, 2012 WL 5989874, at *1–2, *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (holding that being rated
as having unsatisfactory performance alone is not sufficient to constitute an adverse
action); Sotomayor v. City of New York, 862 F. Supp. 2d 226, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 713
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2013); Siddiqi v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
93 See, e.g., Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 2007); Santana v. U.S.
Tsubaki, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 720, 721 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
94 See, e.g., Lara v. Unified Sch. Dist. #501, 350 F. App’x 280, 284 (10th Cir. 2009)
(holding that a threatened transfer is not enough to constitute an unlawful employment
practice); Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
job transfer that increased teacher’s commute from a few minutes to between thirty and
forty minutes is not sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action); Williams v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that being given more stressful job duties
alone is not sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action); Craven v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice-Institutional Div., 151 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (N.D. Tex. 2001). But see
Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that some lateral transfers
do constitute adverse actions); Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting
that an adverse action occurred when employer moved employee’s office to undesirable
location).
95 Chukwuka v. City of New York, 795 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 513
F. App’x 34 (2d Cir. 2013).
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., Paradisis v. Englewood Hosp. Med. Ctr., 680 F. App’x 131, 136–37 (3d Cir.
2017) (per curiam); Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein, 467 F. Supp. 2d 336, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
98 See, e.g., Myers v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, No. 09-3391, 2010 WL 3120070, at *5 (D. Md.
Aug. 9, 2010).
99 See, e.g., White v. Hall, 389 F. App’x 956, 960 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(assigning more difficult work was not adverse employment action); Han v. Whole Foods
Mkt. Grp., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 769, 789 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (increasing workload did not
constitute adverse employment action).
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Courts have even found that conduct is not an adverse action after the ques-
tion has been submitted to a jury and the jury finds that it is one.100
However, the cases are not uniform.  Like the subdoctrines discussed in
Part I, the adverse action concept is also plagued by uncertainty.  For each of
the categories listed above, some courts will recognize the same or similar
conduct as an adverse action:
• giving an employee a negative evaluation or write-up;101
• denying a lateral transfer;102
• transferring an employee to a less desirable job;103
• reprimanding or threatening a worker with disciplinary action;104
• excessively scrutinizing a worker’s job performance;105
• denying training;106
• threatening to fire a worker;107 and
• assigning additional or more difficult work.108
Some courts have noted that “[l]esser actions may also constitute adverse
employment actions,” that there are no bright-line rules as to which employ-
ment actions meet the threshold, and that courts must determine adverse
action on a case-by-case basis.109
The adverse action doctrine invokes its own set of questions, including,
but not limited to, the following.  There are countless negative actions.
Which count as adverse actions and which do not?  Courts also have to
100 See, e.g., Martin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 702 F. App’x 952, 956 (11th Cir. 2017).
101 See, e.g., Hill, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (noting that a negative evaluation can be an
adverse action if it leads to a material adverse change in work conditions).
102 Gaddis v. Russell Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1145 (M.D. Ala.) (describing how
denial of lateral transfer would be adverse action if it affected pay, prestige, or job responsi-
bilities), aff’d mem., 88 F. App’x 385 (11th Cir. 2003).
103 See, e.g., Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that some
lateral transfers do constitute adverse actions); Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 703–04 (7th
Cir. 1987) (finding an adverse action occurred when employer moved employee’s office to
undesirable location).
104 See, e.g., Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 348 (6th Cir. 2012) (find-
ing that disciplinary notice can be an adverse action when it makes the plaintiff ineligible
for promotions).
105 In the discrimination context, most courts hold that excessive scrutiny alone is not
an adverse action. See, e.g., Chukwuka v. City of New York, 795 F. Supp. 2d 256, 260, 262
(S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 513 F. App’x 34 (2d Cir. 2013).  In the retaliation context, some
courts have held excessive scrutiny can be an adverse action.  Corrado v. N.Y. State Unified
Court Sys., No. CV 2012-1748, 2014 WL 4626234, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2014) (discuss-
ing cases).
106 Hill, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
107 Murray v. Town of North Hempstead, 853 F. Supp. 2d 247, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(discussing how threats can be relevant to constructive discharge); see Myers v. Md. Auto.
Ins. Fund, No. 09-3391, 2010 WL 3120070, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2010).
108 See Han v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 769, 789 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(noting that increasing workload could constitute adverse employment action when used
to punish the employee or set her up to fail).
109 Hill, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
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decide what to do when workers allege that two or more of these actions
happen.  For example, is it an adverse action when a supervisor threatens to
fire a worker and then instead of firing her transfers her to a different depart-
ment?  If an action is not an adverse action, can it be used to support a har-
assment theory?  If an employer takes both an adverse action and a
nonadverse action can the plaintiff recover damages for the additional non-
adverse action?  How do the required administrative filing deadlines intersect
with the nonadverse action?  Is the doctrine of adverse action the same in
discrimination and retaliation cases?  Is adversity an objective standard, and if
so, how many of the circumstances of the individual plaintiff and her particu-
lar workplace should be taken into account?
To handle these questions courts then develop a variety of exceptions
and sub-subdoctrines under the adverse action idea, several of which I will
highlight here for purposes of illustration.  Some courts were unhappy with
the idea that all negative evaluations and lateral transfers fell outside the
reach of Title VII, so these courts began to develop legal standards for when
a negative evaluation would count and when it would not.  For example,
some courts will allow a negative evaluation to count if it affects a person’s
“position, grade level, salary, or promotion opportunities.”110  For lateral
transfers, one court recognized a lateral transfer as an adverse action because
the “reassignment would require [the plaintiff] to undergo training and
recertification and would render largely unusable her eight years of
experience.”111
Courts had also used the term “adverse action” or something similar in
the context of retaliation claims.  The Supreme Court clarified what this con-
cept meant in the context of retaliation claims and created another subdoc-
trine.  The Supreme Court held that retaliation must be “materially adverse”
to be cognizable.112  An employee presents an actionable claim if the nega-
tive consequence would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining
about the alleged discrimination.113  Actionable conduct must rise above
110 Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Baloch v.
Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). But see Davis v. Town of Lake Park,
245 F.3d 1232, 1243 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A negative evaluation that otherwise would not be
actionable will rarely, if ever, become actionable merely because the employee comes for-
ward with evidence that his future prospects have been or will be hindered as a result.”).
111 Alvarado v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 07 Civ. 3561, 2012 WL 1132143, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012); see also Rodriguez v. Bd. of Educ., 620 F.2d 362, 366 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding transfer of seasoned middle-school art teacher to an elementary school with
“profoundly different” art programs constituted an adverse action). But see Asanjarani v.
City of New York, No. 09 Civ. 7493, 2011 WL 4343687, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2011)
(finding that “any lateral transfers or reassignments that were unaccompanied by a change
in title or salary cannot be fairly considered ‘demotions’ that would constitute” an adverse
action).
112 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
113 Id.
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“normally petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good
manners.”114
The Supreme Court stated that the reasonable person standard was an
objective one.115  However, the Supreme Court later provided examples that
suggest that the objective standard also includes considering some of the cir-
cumstances of the plaintiff.  The Court indicated as follows:
We phrase the standard in general terms because the significance of any
given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances.
Context matters.  “The real social impact of workplace behavior often
depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words
used or the physical acts performed.”  A schedule change in an employee’s
work schedule may make little difference to many workers, but may matter
enormously to a young mother with school-age children.  A supervisor’s
refusal to invite an employee to lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable
petty slight.  But to retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly train-
ing lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional
advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining
about discrimination.116
The Court held that reassignment of a worker to a job with significantly more
onerous duties was materially adverse treatment even though the reassign-
ment resulted in no loss of wages or other tangible benefits.117  Likewise, the
plaintiff could maintain a retaliation claim for her suspension without pay,
even though the employer eventually awarded her backpay.118
The lower courts have had difficulty reconciling the adverse action stan-
dards in discrimination and retaliation cases.  In some instances, an action
that will not be cognizable in the discrimination context, will be sufficient in
the retaliation context.119
As this subsection shows, just within one prong of the McDonnell Douglas
test there are a variety of subdoctrines and sub-subdoctrines and exceptions.
This is only one small part of the three-part burden-shifting framework.  It is
worth noting that McDonnell Douglas is or was mired in countless doctrinal
questions related to the test enunciated by the Supreme Court.  Indeed, the
Supreme Court has resolved more than fifteen cases that relate to McDonnell
Douglas.120
114 Id. at 68.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 69 (citations omitted) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998)).
117 Id. at 57.
118 See id. at 73.
119 See, e.g., Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 92 (2d Cir. 2015)
(finding a poor performance review can count as an adverse action for purposes of
retaliation).
120 The major Supreme Court cases interpreting McDonnell Douglas, in chronological
order, are McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281 (1976); Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 569 (1978); Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
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2. Similarly Situated
In McDonnell Douglas itself, the Supreme Court articulated the fourth
prong of the prima facie case: “[A]fter his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of com-
plainant’s qualifications.”121  Courts had to determine how to articulate a
fourth prong to apply to varying factual scenarios outside of the hiring con-
text and outside of the particular circumstances of Percy Green’s case.
Courts began to allow plaintiffs to make the fourth prong of the prima facie
by showing that they were treated differently than a similarly situated person
outside their protected class.122  Now, a new concept or term of art is embed-
ded in discrimination jurisprudence: the similarly situated employee.
Just like with the adverse action concept, the issue of whether two people
can be compared for purposes of making an inference of disparate treatment
because of a protected class arises in many different contexts.  Additionally,
the strength of the inference may depend on the other evidence presented
by the plaintiff.
The concept of similarly situated invites many questions.  For example,
how similar do the individuals need to be?  On what dimensions will courts
measure similarity?  If a human resources professional is applying a company-
wide rule to an individual, does this change the level of similarity required?
In cases involving multiple protected classes (such as older women), who are
the correct comparators?  How does comparator evidence intersect with
other evidence that plaintiffs present to show discrimination?
There is a split among circuits (and even within some circuits) about
how similar the plaintiff must be with the comparator.123  The Seventh Cir-
cuit has noted that the plaintiff and the comparator “need not be identical in
every conceivable way”; rather, they must be “‘directly comparable’ to the
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24–25 (1978) (per curiam); Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens (Aikens I),
453 U.S. 902 (1981) (mem.); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens (Aikens II), 460
U.S. 711, 715–17 (1983); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985);
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989) (plurality opinion); Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 510–11, 514–15 (1993); O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 309
(1996); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000); Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003);
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 455 (2006) (per curiam).  Although it encompasses
additional questions, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1353–55 (2015),
also addresses the test.
121 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
122 Goldberg, supra note 3, at 751–59 (explaining deficiencies in similarly situated test).
123 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff is not required to show that those whom
the employer favored and those whom the employer disfavored were similar in all but the
protected ways. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.  However, the courts have not fully explored
what this portion of the Young case means for discrimination law generally.
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plaintiff ‘in all material respects.’”124  The Sixth Circuit has stated that com-
parators must be “nearly identical.”125  It noted:
In order to be similarly situated in the disciplinary context, an employee
“‘must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same
standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiat-
ing or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the
employer’s treatment of them for it.’”126
However, the Sixth Circuit has also reasoned: “The plaintiff need not demon-
strate an exact correlation with the employee receiving more favorable treat-
ment.”127  The Fifth Circuit has stated that the employees must be “under
nearly identical circumstances.”128  That circuit noted:
“The employment actions being compared will be deemed to have been
taken under nearly identical circumstances when the employees being com-
pared held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or
had their employment status determined by the same person, and have
essentially comparable violation histories.”  On the other hand,
“[e]mployees with different supervisors, who work for different divisions of a
company or . . . who have different work responsibilities . . . are not similarly
situated.”  Significantly, if a difference between the plaintiff and the pro-
posed comparator “accounts for the difference in treatment received from the
employer, the employees are not similarly situated for the purposes of an
employment discrimination analysis.”129
The similarly situated idea is a subdoctrine of McDonnell Douglas, which
is already a subdoctrine of the discrimination statutes.  Even within the sub-
subdoctrine of similarly situated, there are distinctions and exceptions.
For example, the Supreme Court has held that a person alleging age
discrimination under the ADEA can use comparator evidence, even where
the comparator is forty or older and thus not outside the protected class.130
While the comparator does not need to fall outside the ADEA’s protected
class, the age difference between the plaintiff and a comparator must be suffi-
cient to establish an inference of discrimination.131  The Supreme Court
noted: “Because the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and
not class membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger
than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is
124 Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 723 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Coleman v.
Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012)).
125 Brown v. Metro. Gov’t, 722 F. App’x 520, 527 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ercegovich v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998)).
126 Id. at 527–28 (quoting Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352).
127 Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352.
128 Heggemeier v. Caldwell County, 826 F.3d 861, 868 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(quoting Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009)).
129 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Lee, 574 F.3d at 259–60).
130 O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312–13 (1996).
131 Id.
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the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected
class.”132
Going further down the rabbit hole of this doctrine, lower courts have
now created standards and rules for what “substantially younger” means.  At
least one circuit has held that a three-year difference between the plaintiff
and the comparator is sufficient.133  The Second Circuit has allowed a one-
year period to suffice when combined with evidence of age-related com-
ments.134  However, other courts have rejected shorter time spans.135  Some
circuits have created bright-line rules to govern lower courts in deciding what
age difference (when standing alone) is sufficient.  For example, the Sixth
Circuit has held that, without more evidence, a plaintiff cannot prevail by
showing that the employer replaced her with a person six years younger.136
The Sixth Circuit has also held that a ten-year gap is presumptively suffi-
cient.137  However, other circuits have declined to adopt bright-line rules.138
Even without bright-line rules, some courts will generally characterize the age
difference that is or is not sufficient to establish an inference.139  Since most
cases do not just rely on comparator evidence, courts must also consider how
these rulings should be applied when a plaintiff presents comparator evi-
dence that is bolstered by additional evidence.
3. Pretext
In the third step of McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff is provided the
opportunity to show that the employer’s stated reason for the employment
action was, in fact, pretext, and that the plaintiff’s protected trait was the real
132 Id. at 313.
133 See Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1003–04 (11th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (three years is enough); see also Liebman v. Metro. Life Ins., 808 F.3d 1294, 1299
(11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (seven years is sufficient); Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets
of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999) (five years).
134 Nembhard v. Mem’l Sloan Kettering Cancer Ctr., 104 F.3d 353, 1996 WL 680756, at
*4 (2d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
135 See, e.g., Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting two-year time period); see also Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., 349 F.3d 332, 338
(6th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases).
136 See Grosjean, 349 F.3d at 340.
137 See id. at 336.
138 See Colandrea v. Hunter-Tannersville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 1:15-CV-0456, 2017 WL
1082439, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2017) (“There is no bright line rule as to the size of an
age discrepancy that is required to support an inference of discrimination . . . .”); Johnson
v. UAH Prop. Mgmt., LP, No. 3:09-CV-0609, 2010 WL 11530908, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10,
2010) (recognizing that neither the Supreme Court nor Fifth Circuit have established a
bright-line rule as to what age difference is too small), aff’d, 428 F. App’x 311 (5th Cir.
2011) (per curiam); Burrows v. Township of Logan, No. 05-458, 2008 WL 4274369, at *6
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2008) (recognizing that the Third Circuit has not yet established a
bright-line rule).
139 See, e.g., Irvin v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., No. 15-518, 2017 WL 354854, at *11 (M.D.
La. Jan. 24, 2017) (explaining that even though there is no bright-line rule in the Fourth
Circuit, many district courts look for an age gap of seven years or more).
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reason for the decision.140  The Supreme Court indicated that the plaintiff
“may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discrimina-
tory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that
the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”141  The
Court held that the “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff.”142
Embedded within McDonnell Douglas is another term of art, “pretext.”143
The word itself has given lower courts problems.  In some cases, courts tend
to use the term “pretext” as a term of art, broadly encompassing any evidence
that suggests a protected trait played a role in an outcome.144  However, in
other cases, courts seem to require the plaintiff to show that the employer is
lying about the reason for its decision.145
Although the courts have encountered numerous problems with decod-
ing the concept of pretext, this subsection focuses on one subdoctrine of the
subdoctrine of pretext: the honest belief doctrine.  The word “pretext” is not
contained within Title VII; nor is the honest belief doctrine.  These are both
court-created concepts.
Under the honest belief doctrine, a court will find that if an employer
took a negative action against an employee based on wrong information,
there is no discrimination if the employer honestly believed the wrong infor-
mation at the time it made the decision.  For example, if an employer fires a
worker for three unexcused absences, the employer will not be held liable for
discrimination if it later turns out that the worker did not have three unex-
cused absences.  Even though the employer was wrong, courts reason, the
reason for the termination was not the worker’s protected trait.146
Like the other ancillary doctrines, the honest belief doctrine invites a
whole host of questions, including, but not limited to the following:  Who has
to prove it?  Is it an affirmative defense?  Whose belief must be honest?  If the
employee brings evidence of possible discrimination to the employer’s atten-
tion before or directly after the contested decision, can the employer still
assert honest belief?  What happens if the employer investigates the
employee’s allegations of discrimination but finds they are without merit and
then takes the contested action?  What happens if there is evidence that a
supervisor reports rule infractions more when the rule breaker is a woman or
a person of color?
140 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973).
141 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
142 Id. at 253.
143 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
144 See, e.g., Irvin, 2017 WL 354854, at *18 (requiring evidence “that age discrimination
was the but-for cause of the employment decision”).
145 See Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that pretext
means the employer lied); Ahuja v. Danzig, 14 F. App’x 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2001) (same).
146 See, e.g., Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 576 (7th Cir. 2015) (considering
whether the employer honestly believed that the employee was dishonest with her
employer when they decided to fire her).
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This subsection focuses on just a tiny fraction of the many issues that
arise under McDonnell Douglas.  It shows a pattern of the courts creating
frameworks that are one step removed from the statutory language.  The
courts then develop subdoctrines and sub-subdoctrines to interpret the
frameworks, leading to even more disarray.
C. Harassment and Faragher/Ellerth
The courts have also developed a robust set of ancillary doctrines in the
context of harassment.  The Supreme Court first recognized that plaintiffs
can prevail under Title VII if they face harassment (or a hostile work environ-
ment) in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.147  In Meritor, the Supreme
Court discussed whether the words “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” encompass sexual harassment.148  The Court stated: “The
phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces a congres-
sional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women’ in employment.”149  The Court then stated that harassment
affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment when it is “suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employ-
ment.’”150  As discussed in Part I above, the Supreme Court created the
“severe or pervasive” doctrine in Meritor.
In Meritor, the Supreme Court also started the seeds for another subdoc-
trine.  At the end of Meritor, the Supreme Court mused about employer liabil-
ity for harassment.  It noted that employers would not be automatically liable
for all harassment that occurred in the workplace but also noted they would
not be shielded from liability just for having a sexual harassment policy.151
Meritor added new terms of art and concepts to Title VII jurisprudence,
like “severe or pervasive” and the idea that employers might not be automati-
cally liable for all harassment that occurs in the workplace.  These are the
first steps away from the statute.
The second step away occurred in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton152 and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.153  In these cases, the Court created a com-
plicated framework for evaluating employer liability.  Even though the cases
were decided on the same day, they provide differing rationales for the enun-
ciated test.
In Faragher, the Court noted that Meritor provided rough contours for
determining employer liability.  First, Meritor indicated that employers would
not be absolved of liability based on the existence of a company complaint
147 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
148 Id. at 63–64 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982)).
149 Id. (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13,
708 (1978)).
150 Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
151 Id. at 72.
152 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
153 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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procedure or in cases where the employer did not possess actual knowledge
of the harassment.154  Second, Meritor indicated that employers would not be
automatically liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment.  Although these
statements in Meritor were arguably dicta, the Faragher Court built upon these
principles.155
The Court looked to agency law and then created an employment-dis-
crimination-specific, agency-like test for determining employer liability for
harassment.  The Court noted that the majority of lower courts had held
coworker harassment to be outside the scope of an employee’s duties and
based employer liability on its own negligence.156  The Court held that an
employer would be automatically liable for a supervisor’s harassment when it
culminated in a tangible employment action but that an employer would
have an affirmative defense to liability when the harassment did not result in
a tangible employment action.157  The words “tangible employment action”
appear nowhere in Title VII and are a court-created term of art.  Nor do the
statutes draw any distinction between employer liability for actions by cowork-
ers versus those committed by supervisors.
Facially, Faragher and Ellerth leave a number of questions unresolved,
including, but not limited to, the following:  How should courts evaluate the
two prongs of the affirmative defense?  Who is a supervisor?  What about if
customers commit the harassment?  What if the harassment is caused by both
supervisors and coworkers?  Is a constructive discharge a tangible employ-
ment action?  How close to the harassment does the tangible employment
action need to be?  What if one supervisor harasses and the other takes the
employment action?  Can employees prove liability through other ways, such
as apparent authority?  What if a supervisor has apparent authority but not
actual authority to take a tangible employment action?  What is a tangible
employment action?
D. Ancillary Doctrines of Faragher/Ellerth
After Faragher and Ellerth, courts were faced with questions about when
employers could get the benefit of the affirmative defense.  The district and
appellate courts needed to define the term “tangible employment action”
and also needed to define who counts as a supervisor for purposes of apply-
ing the affirmative defense.
In Vance v. Ball State University, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split
and defined the term “supervisor” for purposes of the Faragher/Ellerth test.158
154 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
155 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791–92.  The Court also purported to interpret the word
“agent” as used in Title VII, but the resulting analysis is not connected to the statutory
term. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70–72.
156 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–94. See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-
Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851 (2014) (discussing the role of lower-court precedent
in Supreme Court analysis).
157 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
158 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 430–31 (2013).
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Over a robust dissent by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that the only
employees who qualify as “supervisors” for purposes of the Faragher/Ellerth
defense are those who have the power to take tangible employment action
against the complaining employee.159
A tangible employment action means to effect a “significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits.”160  To reach this outcome, the Supreme Court was not
able to rely on the definition of the term “supervisor,” because, as the Court
noted, the word often has different meanings both in colloquial and legal
usages.161  Instead, the Court reasoned that Faragher and Ellerth contem-
plated a sharp division between who was a supervisor and who was not, given
that the test enunciated in those opinions relied heavily on the distinction.162
The Court rejected the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s pro-
posed standard, which the Court stated would lead to uncertainty in
practice.163
In dicta, the Court noted that employers might try to insulate themselves
against automatic liability by vesting the authority to make tangible employ-
ment actions to only a narrow band of employees.164  The Supreme Court
anticipated that employers might still face automatic liability for harassment
in those instances.  It noted that in such situations the small group of individ-
uals able to make tangible employment actions would need to rely on the
recommendations of other workers to make decisions: “Under those circum-
stances, the employer may be held to have effectively delegated the power to
take tangible employment actions to the employees on whose recommenda-
tions it relies.”165
Vance is defining terms that are several steps removed from the original
statutory language.  However, it too is leading to additional questions.  In her
Vance dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that it is unclear whether certain
actions, such as reassignments and discipline, count as tangible employment
actions.166  After Vance, it is unclear what should happen if a person possesses
apparent authority to take an action or influence a supervisor but does not
possess actual authority.167  It is also unclear how much influence a person
must have in an employment decision to count as a supervisor under the
“delegated power” concept.168
159 Id. at 431.
160 Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
161 Id. at 432–34.
162 Id. at 432.
163 Id. at 431–32.
164 Id. at 446–47.
165 Id. at 447.
166 Id. at 464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167 See Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 743 F.3d 726, 739 (10th Cir. 2014).
168 See McCafferty v. Preiss Enters., Inc., 534 F. App’x 726, 731 (10th Cir. 2013);
Delozier v. Bradley Cty. Bd. of Educ., 44 F. Supp. 3d 748, 761 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).
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Courts have spent the last several decades defining Faragher/Ellerth and
all of its subparts, and ambiguities still remain within the court-created doc-
trine.  As discussed in Part IV, the court-created concepts within Faragher/
Ellerth do not remain in their silo.  Instead, they intersect with concepts from
McDonnell Douglas and cat’s paw theory.
III. CAT’S PAW
A fairly recent addition to the canon is the concept of the “cat’s paw,”
formally recognized by the Supreme Court in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.169
With its name coined by Judge Richard Posner and drawn from a fable,170
the concept of cat’s paw has taken ground quickly, discussed in hundreds of
cases.  It has many of the same features of the McDonnell Douglas test and the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense: ill-defined or undefined terms of art and
multiple exceptions.  Its analytical reach is getting further and further from
the employment discrimination statutes.
A. One Step Away
The Supreme Court recognized the cat’s paw theory in Staub v. Proctor
Hospital.171  Vincent Staub sued his employer for terminating his employ-
ment, alleging the employer violated the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).172  USERRA prohibits employers
from discriminating or retaliating against service members based on their
military service.173
The Court stated that the concept of “intent” requires a person to intend
the consequences of his actions or believe that consequences are substantially
certain to occur.174  It noted that even if two of Staub’s supervisors acted with
discriminatory animus, they did not terminate Staub.  Instead, they put nega-
tive performance reports in his file and another individual made the final
decision to fire him.175
The Court continued by deciding whether the hospital can be held lia-
ble for the animus and actions of the two subordinate supervisors.  It stated:
“Perhaps, therefore, the discriminatory motive of one of the employer’s
agents (Mulally or Korenchuk) can be aggregated with the act of another
agent (Buck) to impose liability on Proctor.”176  The Court discussed various
views on agency law and then somehow resolved the agency issue through
causation.  The Court stated:
169 562 U.S. 411 (2011).
170 Id. at 415 n.1.
171 Id.
172 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 562 U.S. 411
(2011).
173 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012).
174 Staub, 562 U.S. at 417.
175 Id. at 417–18.
176 Id. at 418.
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Ultimately, we think it unnecessary in this case to decide what the back-
ground rule of agency law may be, since the former line of authority is sug-
gested by the governing text, which requires that discrimination be “a
motivating factor” in the adverse action.  When a decision to fire is made with
no unlawful animus on the part of the firing agent, but partly on the basis of
a report prompted (unbeknownst to that agent) by discrimination, discrimi-
nation might perhaps be called a “factor” or a “causal factor” in the decision;
but it seems to us a considerable stretch to call it “a motivating factor.”177
The Court ultimately held “that if a supervisor performs an act moti-
vated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an
adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ulti-
mate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”178
Turning to the facts, the Court held that the facts presented could meet the
new standard.179  However, because the jury was not instructed with this stan-
dard, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine
whether the jury’s verdict should be reinstated or whether a new trial should
be granted.180
The Court explicitly noted that it was not deciding a number of ques-
tions related to cat’s paw.  It did not decide what should happen if the
subordinate supervisor intended one outcome, but a different outcome
resulted.181  It also did not decide whether liability would occur if a coworker
(rather than a supervisor) possessed the required bias.182
B. Cat’s Paw: Multiple Steps Away from the Statute
Since Staub, there has been surprisingly little scholarly attention paid to
cat’s paw doctrine.183  The cat’s paw concept creates a litany of unanswered
questions, each of which is likely to cause the courts to create new ancillary
doctrines and terms of art.  Can biased coworkers serve as the conduit?  What
177 Id. at 418–19.
178 Id. at 422 (footnote omitted).
179 Id. at 422–23.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 419 n.2.
182 Id. at 422 n.4.
183 See L. Camille He´bert, The Supreme Court’s 2010–2011 Labor and Employment Law Deci-
sions: A Large and “Mixed Bag” for Employers and Employees, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 279,
293–98 (2011); Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1431, 1432–34 (2012).  Some articles briefly discuss cat’s paw theory. See, e.g., Matthew T.
Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 159,
183–184 (2013); Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased Customer
Feedback into Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2202 (2018) (considering
whether cat’s paw could be used to hold employer’s liable for using discriminatory cus-
tomer feedback); Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381, 1413–14 (2014) (briefly noting the causal questions cat’s
paw theory invites).  For scholarly attention predating Staub, see, for example, Stephen F.
Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: Delineating the Scope of Subordinate
Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383, 389–97 (2008)
(discussing the competing standards established by the circuit courts of appeals).
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about biased customers?  What is the effect of an employer investigation on
employer liability?  Does cat’s paw analysis apply to all instances where one
person is biased and another person is not?  What if the decisionmaker
knows the person giving a recommendation or reporting misconduct has said
or done discriminatory things in the past?  What does proximate cause mean
in the context of employment discrimination?  What if the biased individual
intends one result but sets in motion another outcome?  Is cat’s paw about
agency, intent, causation, or all three?  How does it fit with existing concepts?
Who has to prove cat’s paw and what is the effect of the doctrine?  Is it a
complete defense to liability or is it a partial defense to damages?
The Supreme Court anticipated some of these problems, ducked some
of them, and did not recognize others.  Just following one of these questions
shows how much uncertainty remains within cat’s paw for the lower courts to
resolve.
For example, one question that arises under cat’s paw is the effect of an
independent judgment or investigation by a nonbiased decisionmaker.  The
Court distinguished independent judgment from a subsequent investiga-
tion.184  It specifically held that the independent judgment of a deci-
sionmaker does not break the causal chain.185  The Court purported to
address this problem through proximate-cause jurisprudence.  The Court
noted:
And it is axiomatic under tort law that the exercise of judgment by the deci-
sionmaker does not prevent the earlier agent’s action (and hence the earlier
agent’s discriminatory animus) from being the proximate cause of the harm.
Proximate cause requires only “some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,” and excludes only those “link[s]
that [are] too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.”  We do not think that
the ultimate decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment automatically renders the
link to the supervisor’s bias “remote” or “purely contingent.”186
The Court continued by noting that the decisionmaker’s judgment is a proxi-
mate cause of the decision, but noted that the common law allows for multi-
ple proximate causes.187  It also indicated that the judgment is not a
superseding cause because superseding cause only exists if it is a “cause of
independent origin that was not foreseeable.”188
The Court also rejected the idea that the independent judgment breaks
the causal chain for practical and fairness reasons.  The Court reasoned:
Proctor’s view would have the improbable consequence that if an employer
isolates a personnel official from an employee’s supervisors, vests the deci-
sion to take adverse employment actions in that official, and asks that official
to review the employee’s personnel file before taking the adverse action,
184 Staub, 562 U.S. at 420–21.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 419 (alterations in original) (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Hemi
Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)).
187 Id. at 420.
188 Id. (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)).
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then the employer will be effectively shielded from discriminatory acts and
recommendations of supervisors that were designed and intended to produce
the adverse action.  That seems to us an implausible meaning of the text,
and one that is not compelled by its words.189
The Court held that the mere fact that an investigation occurred did not
relieve the employer of liability.  “The employer is at fault because one of its
agents committed an action based on discriminatory animus that was
intended to cause, and did in fact cause, an adverse employment deci-
sion.”190  The Court also noted: “Since a supervisor is an agent of the
employer, when he causes an adverse employment action the employer
causes it; and when discrimination is a motivating factor in his doing so, it is a
‘motivating factor in the employer’s action,’ precisely as the text requires.”191
However, the Court left room for an investigation to break the causal
chain, in very limited circumstances.  It held that the employer’s investigation
must be “unrelated” to the supervisor’s original biased action.192  The Court
also noted that under USERRA, the defendant would be required to prove
the causal break.193  However, the biased report remains a factor “if the inde-
pendent investigation takes it into account without determining that the
adverse action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely
justified.”194
Predictably, there is a developing ancillary body of jurisprudence about
when investigations are sufficient to cut off liability in cat’s paw cases.195  For
example, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that there is no cat’s paw liability
when the employer “makes an effort” to independently investigate.196  Some
courts are grappling with the issue of whether the employer can claim an
independent investigation if it relied at all on the biased supervisor’s input or
recommendation.  In other words, to break the causal chain, must the investi-
gation show that the adverse action is justified without relying on the biased
supervisor?197
Although cat’s paw doctrine is still in its infancy, it is easy to see how it is
likely to follow the pattern of the other court-created subdoctrines with a
complicated array of new terms of art and even more ancillary doctrines.
189 Id.





195 See Marshall v. Rawlings Co., 854 F.3d 368, 380 (6th Cir. 2017); Roberts v. Columbia
Coll. Chi., 821 F.3d 855, 866 (7th Cir. 2016).
196 Duncan v. Alabama, 734 F. App’x 637, 639 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
197 E.g., Perkins v. Child Care Assocs., 751 F. App’x 469, 476 (5th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam).
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IV. THE FIELD COLLAPSES ON ITSELF
Over the last several decades, courts have spent a tremendous amount of
judicial resources on the court-created doctrines and all of their subdoc-
trines.  Part I demonstrated how the court-created ancillary doctrines do not
help resolve even the simplest kinds of discrimination cases.  Therefore,
there is a big question about exactly what work the subdoctrines perform.
This Part shows how the field is collapsing in on itself.  Courts are now
spending time determining how various subdoctrines intersect with other
subdoctrines and sub-subdoctrines.  Here is a partial list of just some of the
questions that exist among the ancillary doctrines with examples of the kinds
of factual scenarios in which they might arise:
• In a case that raises both disparate treatment and retaliation, would
some negative outcomes create liability for purposes of retaliation
because they are materially adverse, but not create liability for dis-
crimination because they do not meet the different definition of
adverse action?  For example, if a supervisor gave a plaintiff a nega-
tive evaluation because of his race and then later gave him a second
negative evaluation because he complained about discrimination,
would the second evaluation be sufficient to raise a retaliation claim,
even if the first one is not an adverse action?
• Can actions that do not rise to the level of an adverse action for a
discrimination claim nonetheless constitute severe or pervasive har-
assment?  For example, if a supervisor threatens to fire a woman
twice, gives her a negative evaluation, and makes one sexist remark,
can she prove harassment even if the incidents would not support a
sex discrimination claim?
• How does the cat’s paw doctrine intersect with the honest belief doc-
trine?198  For example, if a human resources professional honestly
believes a worker was late for work three times, does the employer
face liability if in the later discrimination case it is revealed that the
reporting supervisor was biased and did not report tardiness of other
similarly situated employees?
• How does cat’s paw intersect with McDonnell Douglas?  Do courts per-
form the two tests separately?  Is cat’s paw analyzed in the third step
of the McDonnell Douglas test?
• When a coworker’s harassment combines with a tangible employ-
ment action, together causing a constructive discharge, can the
employer use the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense?199
• Is the definition of supervisor for cat’s paw doctrine the same defini-
tion the Supreme Court enunciated in Vance for purposes of the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense?200
198 See, e.g., Marshall, 854 F.3d at 380.
199 E.g., Isaac v. Precision Drilling Co., No. 4:16-CV-01253, 2017 WL 4423213, at *6
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2017).
200 See, e.g., Kramer v. Wasatch Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 743 F.3d 726, 738 (10th Cir. 2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 32  6-MAR-20 10:46
1108 notre dame law review [vol. 95:3
• Can you use cat’s paw analysis in cases that require the plaintiff to
establish “but for” cause, such as the ADEA and Title VII retaliation
cases?201
Given that no one wants to read a 200-page law review article, I will focus
on two of these collisions to demonstrate two concerns.  First, these cases
illustrate the worst kind of judicial navel gazing, where the courts are being
drawn into the minutiae of deciding what other judges meant.  Judges are
being diverted away from the factors actually listed in the text of the statutes.
Second, resolving these questions does not help courts answer the question
of why workplace inequality exists or how to stop it from happening.  Indeed,
answering these questions does not help a court resolve whether a particular
plaintiff faced differential treatment because of a protected trait.
A. Staub Supervisor vs. Vance Supervisor
Under cat’s paw doctrine, a worker can establish discrimination under
the following factual scenario: a biased supervisor takes an action intended to
cause an adverse action, and a second unbiased person authorizes the
adverse action based on the biased supervisor’s conduct.202  The Supreme
Court specifically declined to determine if cat’s paw analysis applied to biased
coworker conduct.203  Presently, the distinction between supervisors and
coworkers is important because biased supervisors fall within the doctrine,
and it is still an open question whether biased coworker conduct does.204
In the Staub case, the Supreme Court characterized the case as involving
two biased supervisors, one of whom was Janice Mulally.205  The Court
described Mulally as Staub’s immediate supervisor without fully describing
what actions she could formally take on behalf of the hospital.206  Rather, the
lower court described her as preparing work schedules for the imaging
department where Staub worked.207  The Court also noted that she could
issue disciplinary notices.208  According to the Supreme Court’s recitation of
the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, it appears that Mulally
wanted Staub fired, yet she did not have the power to do it.  When the Court
enunciated its cat’s paw doctrine, it called Mulally a supervisor.209
201 See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346–47 (2013); Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1336
(11th Cir. 2013).
202 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011).
203 Id. at 422 n.4.
204 Smyth-Riding v. Scis. & Eng’g Servs., LLC, 699 F. App’x 146, 156 (4th Cir. 2017);
McCullough v. Whitaker, No. 14-296, 2019 WL 171404, at *6 & n.1 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2019)
(noting issue).
205 Staub, 562 U.S. at 414.
206 See id.
207 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 562 U.S. 411 (2011).
208 Staub, 562 U.S. at 414.
209 Id. at 414, 422.
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Recall that in Vance v. Ball State University, the Supreme Court resolved a
circuit split and defined the term “supervisor” for purposes of the Faragher/
Ellerth test.210  The Court held that the only employees who qualify as “super-
visors” for purposes of the Faragher/Ellerth defense are those who have the
power to take tangible employment action against the complaining
employee.211  A tangible employment actions means to effect a “significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reas-
signment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.”212
Under Vance, it is unlikely that Mulally would be a supervisor.  Thus, it
appears that there are two kinds of supervisors in employment discrimination
law: people that count as supervisors under Staub and those that count as
supervisors under Vance.  Indeed, it does not make sense to incorporate
Vance’s definition of supervisor into the cat’s paw context.  If the first supervi-
sor had the authority to take a tangible employment action, the first supervi-
sor could just take the action, rather than encouraging others to take the
negative action.  It does not make sense to define the term “supervisor” to be
consistent in both contexts.
As discussed in Part V below, courts are failing to see that whether there
is a line between supervisor and coworker varies according to the workplace.
Basing a legal standard on a crisp delineation between the two is always going
to fail because the crisp dichotomy exists in some workplaces and not in
others.  More importantly, reconciling the two kinds of “supervisors” does
not help the courts to understand whether a worker faced discrimination.  In
other words, if a court reframes Mulally as a coworker because she does not
have the power to take tangible employment actions, the distinction between
coworker and supervisor does not in any way change whether the plaintiff
faced discrimination.
Nor do these questions relate to the core concepts of the employment
discrimination statutes: whether a protected trait affected a person’s terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.  The employment discrimination
statutes do not exempt employers from liability just because a coworker,
rather than a supervisor, sets in motion a chain of events.
Coworker status may be important in some cases, because it may point to
a problem with causation.  The coworker’s actions may be so far removed
from the decision that no reasonable jury would find that the coworker’s bias
caused the outcome.  In many (but not all) instances a coworker’s input
would be further removed from an outcome than a supervisor’s input would
be.  However, because the Supreme Court enshrined the concept of supervi-
sor into cat’s paw (and left open the question of what happens with coworker
bias), lower courts are diverted into believing that coworker/supervisor status
might be the relevant issue, rather than causation.  Coworker/supervisor sta-
tus is part of cat’s paw analysis in some circuits but is not contained in the
210 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 430–31 (2013).
211 Id. at 430–32.
212 Id. at 431 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
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federal discrimination statutes.  Causation is included in the discrimination
statutes.
B. Honest Belief, Pretext, and Cat’s Paw
It is also difficult to reconcile the honest belief doctrine, cat’s paw, and
pretext.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court held that a
worker may prove discrimination by showing that the reason provided by the
employer for its decision is not true, but rather is a pretext for discrimina-
tion.213  The Court explained this in detail in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc. when it noted:
Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply
one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimi-
nation, and it may be quite persuasive.  In appropriate circumstances, the
trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the
employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.  Such an
inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the
factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as
“affirmative evidence of guilt.”  Moreover, once the employer’s justification
has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth
the actual reason for its decision.214
In discrimination cases, a jury may find in favor of the plaintiff if it finds that
the employer’s reason is not credible.  The noncredible reason is a proper
basis from which the jury may infer discrimination.
Under the honest belief doctrine, the employer will not be liable for
discrimination if it mistakenly relied on facts when making a decision that
later turned out to be untrue.  One court noted, “When an employer reason-
ably and honestly relies on particularized facts in making an employment
decision, it is entitled to summary judgment on pretext even if its conclusion
is later shown to be ‘mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.’”215  Some courts
have noted that the honest belief rule explicitly contradicts pretext doctrine.
[T]he “honest belief rule” appears to eviscerate the third prong of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis as the employee’s opportunity to show that the
employer’s proffered explanation is merely a pretext for discrimination is
effectively foreclosed.  Keeping in mind that summary judgment should sel-
dom be granted in employment cases, [t]he Court is extremely hesitant to
213 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805, 807 (1973).
214 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (citations omitted)
(quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
215 Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clay v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 713–15 (6th Cir. 2007)).
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apply any rule that decidedly reduces an employee’s opportunity to show
that her employer’s actions were motivated by unlawful discrimination.216
This contradiction is especially visible when one compares the standard
for establishing the third step of McDonnell Douglas against what courts state
about the honest belief doctrine.  For example, in describing the third step
of McDonnell Douglas, another court stated that the plaintiff could meet it
“by demonstrating such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, inco-
herences, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons
for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unwor-
thy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the
asserted nondiscriminatory reasons.”  Pretext may also be shown by provid-
ing direct evidence that the proffered rationale is false, or that the plaintiff
was treated differently from similarly-situated employees.217
Yet, the honest belief doctrine allows a court to find no discrimination, in
some circumstances where its reason for acting is inconsistent with what actu-
ally occurred.  It is difficult to reconcile these two doctrines.
Additionally, it is easy to think of fact scenarios in which an employer’s
honest belief is still compatible with a finding of discrimination.  Imagine
that an employer fires a worker because it honestly, but mistakenly, believed
that the worker stole company property.  The worker is black and has evi-
dence that the company has fired a number of black employees for stealing
company property when the fired employees did not steal any property.  The
evidence shows that the company has never fired a white employee for steal-
ing.  Even if we believe the employer’s reason for the termination, we can
also believe that the company excessively scrutinizes black employees and
wrongfully believes that they are stealing based on their race.
Likewise, many cat’s paw cases are incompatible with the honest belief
doctrine.  The term “cat’s paw” describes a case in which an individual who
does not harbor animus makes the challenged decision.  However, that deci-
sion is impacted by the efforts of another individual who exhibited bias, and
the decisionmaker does not know about the animus at the time the decision
is made.  For example, if a supervisor wanted to discriminate against a black
employee, that supervisor might falsely accuse the employee of work-related
misconduct and then provide that information to the company’s human
resources department.  A human resources representative might then decide
to fire the individual based on the false information.  An employer in such a
scenario might claim that the employee who made the decision had an hon-
est belief about the plaintiff’s misconduct when he or she made the adverse
216 Jennings v. Mid-Am. Energy Co., 282 F. Supp. 2d 954, 963 (S.D. Iowa 2003). But see
Dewitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 845 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding the doctrine does
not eviscerate pretext).
217 Crowe v. ADT Sec. Servs., 649 F.3d 1189, 1196 (10th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)
(quoting Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir.
2007)).
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decision.  However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Staub makes it clear that
using the honest belief doctrine in some cat’s paw cases is not allowed.218
It is incredibly difficult to reconcile the honest belief doctrine with pre-
text and cat’s paw.  More importantly, it is not clear that reconciling these
doctrines is the best way to advance employment discrimination
jurisprudence.
Each of these doctrines, in its own way, asks questions that divert atten-
tion away from the central tenets of employment discrimination.  For exam-
ple, the name of the honest belief doctrine suggests that if a belief is honest,
it cannot be discriminatory.  This is simply untrue.  And, in some cases, focus-
ing on the honesty of the employer’s reason may not be relevant to whether a
protected trait caused a particular outcome.  As discussed earlier, cat’s paw
doctrine is currently unclear about whether coworker status affects its analy-
sis.  Additionally, to the extent that cat’s paw seems to require that a
subordinate intend an adverse action, it is inserting an extra element into the
discrimination inquiry.  Again, the central question is whether a protected
trait caused an outcome.  It is not whether an individual person intended an
outcome and convinced someone else to finalize that outcome.  Each of
these diversions muddles the field further.
V. WHY AND SOME SOLUTIONS
The court-created doctrines discussed in this Article have some common
features.  All of them fail to recognize the complexity of the workplace and
people.  They also enshrine factual inferences that are true in some instances
but not in others.  Ultimately, the courts would be better served to stop creat-
ing new ancillary doctrines and to abolish or greatly diminish those that
already exist.  Courts can use the values contained in the statutory language,
Supreme Court caselaw, and existing rules of procedure and evidence.
When taken together, these sources indicate that the totality of facts matter,
that context is important, that the workplace is complex, and that it is diffi-
cult for judges to make factual inferences when they are not the
factfinder.219  Based on these values, the courts could form statement rules
to serve as a cautionary tale about creating new ancillary doctrines.220
218 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 420 (2011).
219 This is not a question about the different benefits and costs of rules versus stan-
dards.  Most of the ancillary doctrines have both standard-like and rule-like elements. See,
e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561
(1992); cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Essay, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165,
166–68 (2015).
220 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 688 (1990)
(discussing statement rules); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitu-
tional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595 & n.4
(1992).
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A. The Complexity of the Workplace and People
Almost all of the ancillary doctrines memorialize a set of facts into a legal
doctrine.  One of the reasons that the ancillary doctrines often fail is that
they do not take into account the complexity of how discrimination manifests
itself, how decisions are made, which people have power in a workplace, and
how employers choose to organize themselves.
Take, for example, the cat’s paw doctrine.  It is based on a case where
evidence showed two biased supervisors reported alleged misconduct to a
higher-level manager who made a decision.221  This is a fairly specific factual
scenario.  The Supreme Court specifically chose not to answer whether cat’s
paw analysis would apply if a coworker alleged the misconduct.222  Even a
cursory interrogation opens up additional possible factual scenarios, none of
which are explicitly encapsulated within the Supreme Court’s cat’s paw
jurisprudence.
What if a higher-level manager gives biased feedback to a lower-level
manager, and it is the lower-level manager who makes the decision?  What if
a customer gives the biased feedback?  What if the feedback comes from a
friend of the supervisor who is not employed at the company?  What happens
if the biased feedback is not immediately passed along to a person, but sits in
an evaluation or a personnel file and is later used to make a decision?  What
happens if another person tells the decisionmaker that the alleged miscon-
duct did not happen?  What happens if another person tells the deci-
sionmaker that the person reporting the misconduct was biased or applying
different standards to different employees?  What happens when the biased
supervisor has apparent authority to take action?
Or take as another example the honest belief doctrine.  It posits that an
employer is not liable for discrimination if it had an honest belief in the
reason it made a decision, even if later evidence shows the reason was not
correct.  In some factual scenarios this intuition is likely correct, but it is very
difficult (especially at summary judgment) to distinguish cases.  For example,
does an employer get the benefit of the honest belief doctrine if there is
evidence of a pattern of reporting work-rule violations committed by women
or people of certain races?  Can the honest belief doctrine apply if the reason
given might be a race- or sex-based stereotype (e.g., firing a woman because
she is bossy or too emotional)?  What if the worker or others alert the
employer to the possibility of discrimination prior to the decision?  What if
the employer takes a negative action against an employee, even when its own
internal investigation into the underlying conduct was inconclusive?
The ancillary doctrines often fail because they underestimate the com-
plexity of the American workplace.  Many different people impact decisions,
including people who do not work for the employer.223  Many workplaces do
221 See Staub, 562 U.S. at 414–15.
222 Id. at 422 n.4.
223 See Flake, supra note 183, at 2202 (considering whether cat’s paw could be used to
hold employer’s liable for using discriminatory customer feedback).
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not have strict, hierarchical structures.  In some workplaces, people work on
teams where they rotate in and out of leadership roles.  Some employers use
360-degree reviews, where an employee is reviewed by subordinates, supervi-
sors, and others.  Some employers reach decisions through multitiered or
multimembered panels or boards, making it difficult to pin down a deci-
sionmaker.  Employers use technology and algorithms to make decisions.224
There are often differences between the employer’s official policies and what
happens in practice.
Discrimination can manifest itself in a number of ways.  At times, dis-
crimination happens because a biased person makes a biased decision.
Scholars have provided rich theoretical groundwork for thinking about dis-
crimination in other ways: negligent discrimination, structural discrimina-
tion, and unconscious discrimination.  Structural discrimination theorists
have proposed that the locus of discrimination is not always a bad individual
or a company policy but rather unthinking assumptions about how work is
organized.225  Structural discrimination often occurs from a mix of inten-
tional, negligent, and unconscious motives and actions.  Unconscious dis-
crimination posits that discrimination is not always caused by conscious
animus against a protected group.226
Professor David Benjamin Oppenheimer has proposed a theory of negli-
gent discrimination.227  Under this proposal an employer would be liable for
negligent discrimination under two circumstances.  First, the employer would
be liable “when the employer fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent
discrimination that it knows or should know is occurring, or that it expects or
should expect to occur.”228  An employer would also face liability if “it fails to
conform its conduct to the statutorily established standard of care by making
employment decisions that have a discriminatory effect, without first carefully
examining its processes, searching for less discriminatory alternatives, and
examining its own motives for evidence of stereotyping.”229
Any court-created doctrine that fails to take into account this variety will
ultimately fail because it will not be nimble enough for courts to apply it in a
224 Matthew T. Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV.
961, 962 (2017); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
857, 860 (2017).
225 See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 138 (2003).
226 See Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1057
(2017); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 741, 745 (2005); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckon-
ing with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322–25 (1987); Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva
La Evolucio´n!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415,
419 (2000).
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wide variety of factual circumstances.  Or it will become riddled with so many
subdoctrines and exceptions as to render it unusable.
On multiple occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized the need to
value context and flexibility in discrimination cases.  For example, in Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Court noted how the severity of actions
could differ depending on context:
We have emphasized, moreover, that the objective severity of harass-
ment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s position, considering “all the circumstances.” . . . A professional
football player’s working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive,
for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the
field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive
by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the office.  The real social
impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surround-
ing circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully cap-
tured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
performed.  Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context,
will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or rough-
housing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable
person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.230
The Court also recognized the importance of the individual facts of cases in
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, in which it noted:
Context matters. . . . A schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may
make little difference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a
young mother with school-age children.  A supervisor’s refusal to invite an
employee to lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty slight.  But to
retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that con-
tributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement might well
deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination.
Hence, a legal standard that speaks in general terms rather than specific
prohibited acts is preferable, for an “act that would be immaterial in some
situations is material in others.”231
In Ash v. Tyson, the Court noted that determining whether the term “boy”
was racial involved “context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and his-
torical usage.”232
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent in Vance v. Ball State University, recognized
variability within workplace structures:
Supervisors, like the workplaces they manage, come in all shapes and sizes.
Whether a pitching coach supervises his pitchers (can he demote them?), or
an artistic director supervises her opera star (can she impose significantly
230 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) (quoting Har-
ris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
231 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006) (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2005)).
232 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (per curiam).  The dispute about
whether the term “boy” was racial in nature continued after the Supreme Court opinion.
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 F. App’x 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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different responsibilities?), or a law firm associate supervises the firm’s
paralegals (can she fire them?) are matters not susceptible to mechanical
rules and on-off switches.  One cannot know whether an employer has vested
supervisory authority in an employee, and whether harassment is aided by
that authority, without looking to the particular working relationship
between the harasser and the victim.233
Workplace decisions are impacted by a variety of facts that are not easily cap-
tured in a doctrine.  Any doctrine that relies on piecing together specific
facts will ultimately fail because it cannot capture the infinite variety of the
workplace.
B. Factual Inferences
Many of the doctrines also fail because buried within them are factual
inferences that are not universally true, especially when looking at evidence
in its totality.  Working through a few examples is helpful.
Take the similarly situated employee doctrine.  In some circuits, to use
comparator evidence the plaintiff must show that another worker outside her
protected class engaged in nearly identical conduct, worked for the same
supervisor, and held the same position as she did.234  However, it is easy to
imagine hypotheticals in which comparator evidence is relevant, but does not
meet this standard.  For example, imagine a company has a zero-tolerance
violence policy.  A black employee punches a coworker, and the human
resources department recommends that he be fired.  A month before this, a
white employee who works in a different department punched a coworker,
and the human resources department recommended retaining the
employee.  Even though the two workers do not meet the similarly situated
requirement in some circuits, this evidence would still be relevant to whether
the black employee faced race discrimination.
Or, imagine that a woman is the only administrative assistant in a depart-
ment.  Even though the workers have fixed work hours according to com-
pany policy, the supervisor has never reported any workers for being late,
even though everyone in the department has been late to work on multiple
occasions.  The woman tells her supervisor that she is pregnant.  The supervi-
sor begins to report every time the woman is even one minute late for work.
Even though the other workers in the department do not have the same posi-
tion as the pregnant employee, this comparator evidence is still relevant.
Factual inferences are also contained within the adverse action doctrine.
The lower courts have tried to draw bright-line rules about what actions
count as discrimination and which do not.  However, factual claims like “a
negative evaluation is never serious” quickly unravel when applied to real-
world problems.  For example, if a company regularly uses evaluations for
determining which employees to put in promotion pools, which employees
to terminate in a reduction in force, whether to put employees on perform-
233 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 465 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234 See, e.g., Brown v. Metro. Gov’t, 722 F. App’x 520, 527–28 (6th Cir. 2018).
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ance improvement plans, or which employees are eligible for bonuses, a rea-
sonable employee would consider a negative evaluation to be serious and also
to be a change in the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment.
Faragher/Ellerth makes multiple factual inferences.  It assumes there is a
stark dividing line between supervisors and nonsupervisors.  It assumes that
the ability to take tangible employment actions is significant, while ignoring
that supervisors and others can take official actions short of tangible employ-
ment actions, like changing a worker’s shift or assigning her less desirable
tasks within her job description.
Likewise, the McDonnell Douglas test, especially in the prima facie case
and the pretext analysis, makes a number of factual inferences that are true
in some cases but not in others.  It is not true that a worker who establishes
the prima facie case should always be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination.  Nor is it true that a worker always has enough evidence of
discrimination to get to a jury by establishing pretext.  Imagine a case where a
white man applies for a job, is qualified for a job, and the employer chooses
not to hire the worker but keeps looking to fill the position.  The employer
eventually hires a woman.  The reason the supervisor gives for refusing to
hire the man is that he did not interview well.  However, the real reason the
supervisor does not hire him is because the applicant dated his sister and
broke up with her.  All of the elements of McDonnell Douglas are present here,
yet there are no facts suggesting that the man was not hired because of his
sex.
Perhaps in response to overclaiming within McDonnell Douglas, courts
have introduced concepts such as the honest belief doctrine to try to rein in
McDonnell Douglas.  However, in doing so, they also created a doctrine that
contains problematic factual inferences.  Just because a supervisor actually
believes a nondiscriminatory reason for a decision does not mean that the
decision was not influenced by the person’s protected class.  If a coworker
regularly reports a minority coworker for tardiness and the minority
coworker is fired by a supervisor, the worker’s race might have impacted the
decision, if other workers were tardy and not reported.  The cat’s paw scena-
rio presented in Staub gives another example of where discrimination might
have happened despite the honest belief of a supervisor.235
Many of the ancillary doctrines fail because the factual inferences they
draw are not universally accurate.
C. Proposed Paths Forward
The ancillary doctrines are ineffective.  There is no end in sight to the
courts’ creation of doctrines, subdoctrines, sub-subdoctrines, and terms of
art.  Now the courts are pulled into countless questions about how to recon-
cile all of the various court-created doctrines.  The ancillary doctrines rely on
inaccurate factual inferences and underestimate the variety of the American
workplace.
235 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 (2011).
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Yet, at the same time, the federal courts must continue to adjudicate
cases and federal judges must give reasons for their rulings.  Fortunately,
there is a path forward that relies on statutory language, existing caselaw, the
Federal Rules of Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Rather than
point to a particular outcome in a particular fact scenario, this approach pro-
vides general guidance to judges about how to view facts.  It countenances
against using rigid, fact-specific doctrines.
As I have advocated in the past, the language of the federal discrimina-
tion statutes (while inexact) provides a workable framework through which
to resolve most disparate treatment cases.236  The language also refuses to
confine discrimination to specific facts.
Take for example the language of Title VII.  Under the first subpart, it is
an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”237  This language asks whether a worker’s protected class
caused certain kinds of negative outcomes.  It does not require that the con-
nection be proven in any particular way.  Nor does it require that any particu-
lar people cause or intend the outcome.  Additionally, a worker can prevail
under Title VII’s second subpart, which makes it is unlawful for an employer
“to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”238
The courts should defer to this broad approach.  The federal discrimina-
tion statutes do not rely on fact-specific rules about what counts as discrimi-
nation and what does not.  Instead, they inherently recognize that fact-
specific rules are not workable and that a broader approach is required.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized: “The phrase ‘terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employ-
ment.”239  And, the Court has also noted that lower courts must consider the
totality of the evidence, viewed under the lens of applicable rules of civil
procedure.240
There are multiple Supreme Court cases that warn against applying
inflexible analytical structures.  For example, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, the Supreme Court indicated that the prima facie proof would need to
change according to the facts of the underlying case.241  In O’Connor v. Con-
236 Sperino, supra note 1, at 115.
237 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
238 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
239 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
240 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147–49 (2000).
241 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973).
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solidated Coin Caterers Corp., the Court chided the lower courts for requiring
age-discrimination plaintiffs to prove that they were treated differently than
someone under the age of forty (outside the protected class), because this
required the plaintiff to prove too much.242  Evidence that an employer pre-
ferred fifty-year-olds over sixty-five-year-olds might also suggest age
discrimination.243
Title VII’s language and the Supreme Court’s statements about context,
flexibility, and the importance of looking at all of the evidence, call into
question the continued use of fact-specific ancillary doctrines.  The federal
courts could adopt statement rules to express a preference against creating
new ancillary doctrines that enshrine factual inferences and make judgments
about a fixed notion of the American workplace and how discrimination
manifests itself.  For example, one statement rule might be:
Context matters in employment discrimination cases.  “The
real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a con-
stellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relation-
ships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the
words used or the physical acts performed.”244  It is often impossi-
ble to find a rigid framework that applies in every case.  Flexibility is
required.
This kind of statement rule is bolstered by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, which instruct judges on how
to respond to evidence.  Judges are often using the ancillary doctrines when
ruling on an employer’s summary judgment motion.  Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires judges to get out of the weeds, look at the
totality of the evidence, and make all inferences supported by the evidence in
favor of the nonmoving party.245  Thus, while the summary judgment stan-
dard does not mandate a particular outcome for a particular set of facts, it
does tell judges to not make inferences in favor of the moving party.  This is
the role for the factfinder, not the judge ruling on a summary judgment
motion.  Encapsulated within Rule 56 is a skepticism about a judge’s ability to
make factual inferences, especially considering that summary judgment
motions are considered on a paper record.
Likewise, the Federal Rules of Evidence adopt a broad, non-fact-specific
framework for determining relevance.  Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any
242 O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312–13 (1996).
243 See id.
244 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006) (quoting Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998)).
245 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1280–81
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (interpreting Rule 56(a));
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 (interpreting Rule 50(a) to require a
court to review all evidence on the record and draw inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party).
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tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”246
Taken together, these general principles can get courts out of the weeds
of the ancillary doctrines.  For example, rather than enshrine or apply a cat’s
paw doctrine, judges could ask whether there is evidence from which a rea-
sonable jury could believe that a plaintiff’s protected class caused a negative
outcome.  Judges might discuss how it is possible for a negative outcome to
be caused by biased input from a nondecisionmaker.  This analysis relies on
concepts contained within the statutory language.  Without a cat’s paw doc-
trine, the jury in Staub was able to reason that Staub was likely fired because
of his military service.247
However, the judge should not be forced to determine whether a biased
supervisor intended an adverse action, as enshrined in cat’s paw jurispru-
dence.  These concepts (that a supervisor intended to cause an adverse
action) are not contained within the employment discrimination statutes,
and thus, this articulation of cat’s paw diverts a courts attention from the
statutes’ core concepts.
The judge would determine whether a case should proceed by giving
deference to the idea that context and the totality of the circumstances mat-
ter in employment discrimination cases, that it is unlikely that any subdoc-
trine will be flexible enough to be useful, and that the governing rules of civil
procedure limit the instances in which a judge can draw inferences in favor
of a nonmoving party.
I am not arguing that this method resolves all difficult questions in
employment discrimination law.  For example, courts will still need to resolve
whether some conduct is so de minimis that it does not meet the statutory
threshold or what the required causal connection is.  However, this is a
smaller subset of cases than those currently implicated by the ancillary
doctrines.
Additionally, as discussed throughout this Article, the ancillary doctrines
tend to introduce new concepts into the jurisprudence, rather than focusing
on the concepts contained in the discrimination statutes or the applicable
rules of procedure and evidence.  Even if courts abolish the ancillary doc-
trines, judges will still need to decide whether certain evidence is relevant.
Using relevance as the required standard is preferable to using the constructs
of the similarly situated comparator or the stray remarks doctrine.  Both of
these doctrines require a judge to do more than determine the relevance of
the underlying evidence.
This path forward is workable as demonstrated by a fairly recent Seventh
Circuit case.248  The Seventh Circuit had previously held that a plaintiff may
prevail on a discrimination claim through either a direct method or an indi-
246 FED. R. EVID. 401.
247 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 562 U.S. 411
(2011).
248 Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016).
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rect method.249  The court had further held that a plaintiff could prevail
under the direct method by showing a convincing mosaic of circumstantial
evidence.250  However, the circuit recently retracted the convincing mosaic
framework, in part, because judges were improperly using it to restrict how
they viewed evidence.251  As the Seventh Circuit noted: “The district court
treated each method as having its own elements and rules, even though we
have held that they are just means to consider whether one fact (here, ethnic-
ity) caused another (here, discharge) and therefore are not ‘elements’ of any
claim.”252
The Seventh Circuit also noted that even though it had tried to warn
courts not to treat the convincing mosaic test as the “elements” of a “claim,”
its admonitions did not work.253  The Seventh Circuit noted:
Today we reiterate that “convincing mosaic” is not a legal test. . . . From
now on, any decision of a district court that treats this phrase as a legal
requirement in an employment-discrimination case is subject to summary
reversal, so that the district court can evaluate the evidence under the cor-
rect standard.
That legal standard . . . is simply whether the evidence would permit a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex,
religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse
employment action.  Evidence must be considered as a whole, rather than
asking whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself—or
whether just the “direct” evidence does so, or the “indirect” evidence.  Evi-
dence is evidence.  Relevant evidence must be considered and irrelevant evi-
dence disregarded, but no evidence should be treated differently from other
evidence because it can be labeled “direct” or “indirect.”254
The federal courts could use a similar approach to eradicate or greatly
diminish the use of the ancillary doctrines.  Getting rid of cat’s paw doctrine
may be the easiest because it is the most recent ancillary doctrine.  However,
courts could take a similar approach to all of the ancillary doctrines.
If courts choose to retain some or all of the ancillary doctrines, they
could still limit their use by relying more heavily on general principles of
relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence, by heeding the Supreme
Court’s admonitions that context and flexibility matter, and by following the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s enshrined preferences that factfinders, not
judges, decide contested facts.
CONCLUSION
Federal employment discrimination jurisprudence is mired in ancillary
doctrines.  These ancillary doctrines tend to enshrine specific factual scena-
249 Id. at 764.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 763.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 765.
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rios into legal doctrine, making inferences about when a specific factual sce-
nario counts as discrimination.  The American workplace is complex, and
discrimination manifests itself in many ways.  It is difficult to reduce discrimi-
nation jurisprudence into a fact-based set of universal rules.  Doing so only
causes a multitude of unworkable rules.
The federal courts should abolish or diminish the ancillary doctrines.
They should adopt a statement rule that cautions them against creating ancil-
lary doctrines that rely on the inferences to be drawn from certain factual
scenarios.  This kind of statement rule represents the language of the federal
discrimination statutes, Supreme Court pronouncements about context and
flexibility, and preferences about inferences and evidence enshrined in the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
